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Abstract
The paper reviews the economic and administrative issues that arise in the taxation of
electronic commerce; addresses how best to meet the criteria of an ideal tax system; and
examines recent policy developments. It is argued that destination-based taxation–as is
presently the norm for goods taxation–is technically more complex for digital products
and intangible services sold over the Internet, reﬂecting the diﬃculty of determining the
location of the buyer and seller. Most of the potential solutions to this problem require
a great deal of administrative cooperation between national tax authorities. Case stud-
ies of several countries show that policy responses to electronic commerce have diﬀered,
with the European Union taking the lead on implementing a system of destination-based
registration.
JEL codes: H20l, H73
Keywords: Destination principle, international consumption taxation, electronic com-
merce, origin taxation, cross-border trade
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most consumption taxes in use around the world were designed at a time when local merchants
mainly sold manufactured products to consumers who lived nearby. Today, rapid advances
in network technology and declining transaction costs to consumers have led to an explosive
growth in Internet commerce. In the United States, for example, Internet sales are estimated
to grow on average by almost 70 percent a year between 1999 and 2004.1 The Internet
potentially enables a consumer to buy virtually any product from any seller anywhere in the
∗This paper was initiated while the author was working at the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Aﬀairs
Department. The author gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support by the Dutch Ministry of Finance. All
views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Dutch Ministry of
Finance.
`Ministry of Finance Professor of Economics and Professor of Quantitative Economics, Department of
Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, Phone:
+31-13-466-8755, Fax: +31-13-466-3042, E-mail: j.ligthart@uvt.nl.
1Estimated by Forrester Research. See Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) for further details.
1world. This cross-border electronic commerce2 makes it diﬃcult for revenue administrators
to tax consumer goods and services and leads to the erosion of consumption-tax revenue.
The debate on the taxation of electronic commerce was initially focused on the sale of
tangible products to businesses and consumers; these transactions still account for the largest
percentage of Internet sales. The sale of a tangible product does not raise any fundamental
taxation issues, because the proper destination-based consumption tax can be levied once the
consignment passes through customs. However, if both the product and payment method are
digitized, for example, downloaded software paid for with electronic cash,3 complicated en-
forcement issues arise because the origin and the destination of the transactions are obscured.
Can digitized transactions be taxed? Should they be taxed? To answer these questions,
it is necessary to weight the eﬃciency and revenue gains from taxes on digitized transactions
against the compliance costs to consumers and the administrative costs to tax authorities.
This paper reviews: (i) the economic and administrative issues involved in taxing electronic
commerce; (ii) how best to tax electronic transactions to meet the criteria of a good tax
system, such as eﬃciency, administrative simplicity, and a fair sharing of the tax base; (iii)
tax-collection proposals, ranging from the traditional vendor collection method to models
employing third parties;4 and (iv) recent policy developments in the European Union, the
United States, and Canada.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the nature of
electronic commerce and discusses the challenges that electronic commerce poses to tax ad-
ministrators who rely upon traditional taxation principles. Section 3 discusses the pros and
cons of the taxation of electronic commerce. Section 4 deals with models to tax electronic
commerce, ranging from the traditional vendor collection model to new approaches employ-
ing third parties. Section 5 outlines recent policy developments in the taxation of electronic
commerce in the European Union, the United States, and Canada. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Nature of Electronic Commerce
This section studies how traditional commerce and electronic commerce diﬀer. For purposes of
discussion, electronic commerce is broken down into transactions in tangibles and transactions
in intangibles. First, common practices in the assignment of jurisdictional taxation rights in
2In the rest of the paper electronic commerce is narrowly deﬁned to mean sales of goods and services across
boundaries both domestic and international. Conventional deﬁnitions of electronic commerce typically cover
all sales over the Internet (including local transactions), with or without online payment (OECD, 2001a).
3Electronic cash is deﬁned as various self-authenticating digital payment systems other than conventional
credit cards.
4Initially, most of the discussion about the taxation of electronic commerce took place in the political arena;
recently, however, academics have participated in the debate and developed a number of proposals and models.
2traditional commerce are reviewed. A distinction is drawn between interjurisdictional sales
within a federation and cross-border sales between sovereign states.
2.1 Traditional Cross-Border Commerce
With respect to the taxation of trade in goods among sovereign nations, a distinction can
be drawn between the destination principle and the origin principle of taxation. Under the
destination principle, exports are exempt from consumption tax–for example, a value-added
tax (VAT) or a sales tax–and are subsequently taxed at the rate levied by the importing
country, resulting in taxation at the place of consumption.5 Tax revenue accrues to the
country, in which the ﬁnal sale occurs. In a world of perfect competition, the destination
principle implies that all ﬁrms receive the same tax-exclusive price from selling in any location
irrespective of their country of residence. This leads to production eﬃciency in the sense of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) because producers equate their marginal costs to a common
producer price. The destination principle is considered to generate a fair distribution of the
tax burden: the private consumption base is viewed as a much better proxy for the beneﬁts
of public goods than other tax bases, such as production.
Under the origin principle, consumption tax is collected at source–that is, at the place
where the goods are produced or exported. Imported commodities are exempted to avoid
double taxation. The origin principle implies that consumer prices (or tax-inclusive prices),
adjusted for transportation costs, are equated across countries. Origin-based taxation induces
ﬁrms to locate in low-tax countries, which it is feared will give rise to a “race to the bottom” in
taxes, undermining countries’ ability to raise revenue. The OECD (1998) speaks of “harmful
tax competition.” Some authors, among others, Wilson (1999), have challenged this notion;
tax competition may also have the beneﬁcial eﬀect of reducing a country’s incentives to expand
an already ineﬃciently large government. Moreover, tax competition may induce government
oﬃcials to oﬀer public-good packages that are more in line with the preferences of voters.6
Destination-based taxation is the international norm and is supported by the OECD,
the European Union, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The origin principle is
rarely applied in practice to trade, except for trade among the former members of the Soviet
Union. Theoretically, as Lockwood (2001) argues, the case for preferring destination-based
taxation over origin-based taxation on eﬃciency grounds is strong but not absolute. Only
under two very restrictive assumptions–which typically are not met in practice–are the two
principles equal. First, within each country the consumption tax rate should be the same for
all commodities, although that uniform rate may diﬀer across countries. Uniformity implies
that relative producer prices are equated to relative consumer prices in each country; thus,
equating one set of relative prices across countries–for example, relative producer prices
5To ensure that only ﬁnal consumption is taxed, tax levied at previous stages of production and distribution
must be fully credited against output tax.
6See Wilson (1999) and Wildasin and Wilson (2004) for an overview of theories of tax competition.
3under the destination principle–would also equate the other. Second, bilateral goods trade
between countries should be balanced (Whalley, 1979), so that a change from taxing imports
to taxing exports would not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on revenue.
2.2 Traditional Commerce Within a Federation
How is the destination principle implemented in a federal system like that of the United
States? The states have no physical borders, so the necessary border adjustments to tax
cannot be made to tax at the place of consumption. This problem is partly solved by legally
requiring the buyer to pay a so-called use tax on out-of-state purchases–allowing for a credit
for any retail sales tax7 possibly paid–to the buyer’s state of residence. Such a system of
“reverse charging” or self-assessment would be feasible for easily traced business-to-business
sales,8 but it is more cumbersome to apply in the case of business-to-consumer sales. It
amounts to a tax on honesty. Indeed, consumers’ compliance with use taxes is extremely
low, unless they are required to register durable goods, such as cars or boats.9 Accordingly,
traditional interjurisdictional sales to consumers are typically taxed on an origin basis.
A natural solution to the compliance problem in business-to-consumer sales is to involve
remote vendors (that is, those located outside the taxing jurisdiction) in the collecting and
remitting of use taxes on big-ticket items. In the United States, however, the Supreme Court
in 196710 and 199211 held that mail-order suppliers are not required to collect and remit use
taxes on out-of-state sales unless the enterprise has a “nexus” within the state’s borders. A
nexus exists when the supplier has a physical presence in the state in the form of a store,
warehouse, or stationed personnel. The rationale is that without a nexus, it would be hard
to impose tax; with approximately 7,600 jurisdictions involved12–each employing diﬀerent
tax rates and diﬀering deﬁnitions of the tax base–it would be administratively costly for
mail-order merchants to collect and remit use taxes for which they would typically receive no
compensation.13
7Forty-ﬁve US states and the District of Columbia levy a single-stage sales tax at the retail level. European
countries, however, levy a VAT, which applies tax in principle to all levels of the production-distribution chain
up to and including the retail stage.
8Under both sales tax systems and VAT systems, business-to-business sales are subject to periodic compli-
ance review, unlike most business-to-consumer sales. In a VAT system, businesses would have a clear incentive
to comply because they have to report their VAT liabilities on sales in order to secure VAT refunds on inputs
purchased.
9See Murray (1997) on voluntary compliance with use taxes in the United States.
10National Bellas Hess Corporation versus the Department of Revenue for the State of Illinois.
11Quill Corporation versus the State of North Dakota. Quill, which involved a major mail-order house, is
discussed in Hellerstein (1992). The US Congress could enact legislation to overrule Quill without requiring a
change in the constitution; see Hellerstein (1997).
12Included are 45 states plus the District of Columbia and many local governments that impose their own
sales taxes. Typically, the local sales tax bases follow roughly the outlines of the state tax bases, particularly
in states that administer the local sales taxes.
13Cline and Neubig (1999) produce estimates of compliance costs ranging from 1 percent of tax revenue for
4In a customs union like the European Union, a remote seller of a member state has a
nexus if it has a substantially large economic presence that can aﬀect local businesses.14
The European Commission has set a VAT registration threshold of euro 100,000 a year for
distance sales of tangible products to consumers and unregistered traders within the European
Union;15 thus, very small mail-order ﬁrms do not have to register for and pay VAT. If sales
exceed the threshold, remote EU vendors must register in the EU member state where the
customer is located and collect the VAT of that state, in keeping with a true destination-
based system. This registration system does not apply to tangible services, which are taxed
on an origin basis. Sales between registered traders in the European Union are based on a
reverse charging system, in which exports are zero-rated16 and purchasers are expected to
self-assess the tax of the destination member state. Thus, remote vendors must be able to
diﬀerentiate between sales to registered traders and sales to others. The VAT Information
Exchange System (VIES) was set up to enable companies to easily conﬁrm the validity of
VAT registration numbers and to allow tax administrators to monitor and control the ﬂow of
intra-EU trade.17
2.3 Electronic Commerce in Tangibles
Via the Internet, a purchaser can buy tangible goods (CDs, computer equipment, clothing,
etcetera)18 from virtually any online seller in the world, thereby reducing a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed costs of
entering new markets. Some authors, for example, Li (2003), claim that electronic commerce
has substantially reduced physical trade distances between countries. The Internet may have
bridged distances for the purposes of marketing and ordering, but Freund and Weinhold
(2004) ﬁnd little evidence that the Internet has directly aﬀected the negative relationship
between distance and international trade. Shipping costs and imperfect information about
foreign markets still play a signiﬁcant role in conﬁning trade generated in cyberspace to certain
geographic areas, although these factors are thought to be less important in sales of digitized
(that is, intangible) products.
Let us ﬁrst look at cross-border Internet sales transactions. If a US customer purchases
a book over the Internet from a seller in the United Kingdom, the proper destination-based
consumption tax and applicable customs tariﬀ can be levied when the consignment crosses
customs control at the US border. Such a sale does not raise any fundamental taxation issues.
large ﬁrms doing business in one state to 87 percent of tax revenue for small ﬁrms doing business in 45 states.
14Trade of non-member countries with EU countries is taxed “at the border.”
15A disadvantage of employing thresholds is the risk of unequal treatment of those traders above and below
the threshold. Optimal thresholds are derived by equating the marginal collection costs to marginal revenue.
16To protect the destination basis of VAT applied to interjurisdictional trade, a number of reform proposals
are proposed, which are reviewed in Bird and Gendron (2000) and Keen (2000).
17Taxable persons are required to ﬁle on a quarterly basis all sales to and purchases from other EU member
states.
18Tangible services are typically supplied and consumed locally.
5As these types of transactions become more common, customs authorities will have to handle
signiﬁcantly greater ﬂows of small consignments. Keen (2002) and Bacchetta (1998) have
suggested to raise customs exemptions for small consignments, particularly when the costs
of inspection and collection are likely to exceed the revenue raised.19 In this context, the
United States–the world’s largest Internet seller and a net exporter of products sold via the
Internet (cf. Bacchetta and others (1998))–could unilaterally raise customs exemptions to
induce other countries to follow suit.
What about the interjurisdictional taxation of electronic commerce within a federation?
In the United States, most Internet transactions involve tangible products sold by out-of-state
vendors, and in this sense do not diﬀer very much from mail-order catalogue purchases. It does
not matter whether a book is ordered by postal mail or over the Internet from an out-of-state
mail-order ﬁrm; both transactions require physical delivery to the consumer’s home. The
taxation problem boils down to the question of how to charge sales tax according to the place
of consumption in a federal system. The nexus issue plays a role here. Although the Quill
ruling explicitly deals with mail-order sales, ita l s oa p p l i e st oe l e c t r o nic commerce (including
remote sales of digital content). Accordingly, most Internet sales in the United States now
escape sales and use tax. But it is unclear how the term “physical presence” should be
interpreted in a digital world. Peha and Strauss (1997) argue that a vendor can have a
taxable nexus in a state where it uses agents to provide services. This raises the question
whether remote vendors have a nexus in the state where their Web site hosting service is
located. In the electronic commerce debate, OECD countries have interpreted nexus issues
in a narrow sense that does not encompass Web site hosting (see also Section 4).
Electronic commerce allows customers to purchase their products directly from online
suppliers, giving rise to a compressed production-distribution chain, which is known as the
so-called Threatened Intermediaries Hypothesis (cf. Sarkar, Butler and Steinﬁeld (1995)).20
O w i n gt ot h ea b s e n c eo fp r o ﬁt margins of traditional intermediaries (distributors, brokers,
sales representatives, etcetera), prices can be lower, resulting in a smaller consumption tax
base. Disintermediation also reduces the number of tax collection points, which in turn
reduces tax administration costs but also limits the tax authorities’ control over the ﬂow
of commerce.21 This eﬀect is partly oﬀset by the introduction of new intermediaries–for
example, Internet Service Providers (ISPs),22 Web site hosting services, and authentication
services.
19These exemptions lower the eﬀective taxation of cross-border trade over the Internet, thereby adversely
aﬀecting a nation’s revenues and distorting household purchasing decisions.
20This is a more serious issue if digital transactions that can be directly delivered online are involved. In
that case, the traditional distribution chain is no longer needed.
21This point is particularly relevant for countries that impose VAT, which is applied to the value-added at
each stage in the production-distribution chain.
22ISPs provide the service of Internet connectivity.
6New services related to the Internet have blurred the distinctions between the stages of
the production-distribution chain. Tax administrators of countries with a single-stage retail
sales tax, such as the United States, face the diﬃcult task of identifying the true retail func-
tion and avoiding double taxation at that level. For example, Peha and Strauss (1997) argue
that network service providers often sell services to each other–and are typically adding on
new services–potentially giving rise to a taxable service function at both the wholesale and
the retail level. In addition, Li (2003) argues that the convergence in information technology
industries makes it hard to distinguish between diﬀerent types of services for which diﬀerent
place-of-supply rules may apply. For example, Voice Over Internet Protocol–that is, a tech-
nology that permits telephone calls to be made via the Internet–is a bundling of a traditional
telecommunications service with Internet access.
2.4 Electronic Commerce in Intangibles
Tax collectors are concerned primarily with the sale of intangible products over the Internet,
even though the international sales of intangibles constitute only a small percentage of total
electronic commerce. Boyle and others (1999) have estimated that in 2001 digital sales in
the United States and Europe amounted to only 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of
total electronic commerce. Because intangible (digital) products–for example, downloaded
software, music, games, movies, and books23–and intangible services24 are delivered elec-
tronically and thus cannot be checked or recorded at the border, jurisdictional and national
boundaries are not relevant. Digital transactions raise more diﬃcult tax-compliance issues
than purchases and sales of tangible goods and services. To be able to eﬀectively tax a
consumption transaction under traditional taxation principles, tax collectors need to know
where the transaction takes place and whether the transaction involves a good or a service.
In addition, tax administrators rely on a paper trail of transactions for auditing purposes;
digital transactions typically do not generate such records.
Vendors of intangibles often do not know–and usually do not need to know–the physical
location of their customers. The relative anonymity of the Internet makes it easy for customers
to hide their identity and their physical location, either for privacy reasons or to avoid the
payment of tax. Moreover, it may be diﬃcult for the tax authorities to determine the locations
of the vendors, which would normally collect consumption taxes. For example, a vendor may
sell its products through a Web site on a server located in a country or jurisdiction other
23Cockﬁeld (2002) classiﬁes these as “information goods” to distinguish them from “traditional” intangible
goods such as patents, copyrights and trademarks.
24A distinction should be drawn between tangible and intangible services. Tangible services (delivery of
public utilities, provision of lodgings, rentals of tangible property, food services, etcetera) are physically per-
formed at an identiﬁable location. Intangible services (consultancy, accountancy, advertising, broadcasting,
data processing, banking, provision of information, medical consultations over the Internet, etcetera), cannot
readily be seen to take place at a particular location. The OECD applies the rule that any services capable of
electronic delivery are classiﬁed as intangible.
7than the purchaser’s. The point of origin and the destination of a transaction are obscured,
making it hard for tax collectors to enforce ﬁscal frontiers. These issues are discussed in more
detail in Section 4.
Typically, countries apply diﬀerential tax rates to goods and services. This necessitates a
clear classiﬁcation of digital products as one or the other. But technological developments have
begun to blur the boundaries between goods and services. Is a downloaded movie functionally
the same product as a movie rented or bought at a store? If it is not, a case can be made to
classify the former as a digital (or electronically delivered) service–that is, the provision of
information–which is the line taken by the European Commission (2002). Most intangible
services go untaxed in the United States, but not in the European Union. In Canada, digitized
products are classiﬁed as intangible personal property, which is taxable under the federal
Goods and Services Tax (GST). Clearly, country experiences diﬀer, potentially giving rise to
double taxation or no taxation at all of cross-border trade (see Section 5).
3 The Pros and Cons of Taxing Electronic Commerce
Can electronic commerce be taxed? Should it be taxed? The explosive growth of Internet
sales over the last ﬁve years has heightened the urgency of these questions, particularly in
the United States, where most Internet purchases go untaxed. In the debate, it is understood
that local retail sales over the Internet would have to be taxed to prevent the routing of
transactions from terminals in bricks-and-mortar stores to the Internet and back. Without
local taxation, the sales tax would become in the popular phrase, road kill on the information
super highway. Moreover, the emerging international consensus, as discussed below, is that
interjurisdictional Internet sales should not be exempted either.
Traditional retailers and some academics25 argue that remote sellers (without a physical
presence) enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over local bricks-and-mortar retail stores be-
cause they do not have to charge sales tax.26 A study by Goolsbee (2000) shows that people
w h ol i v ei nU Ss t a t e sw i t hh i g hs a l e st a xr a t e sa r es i g n i ﬁcantly more likely to buy online than
people who live in states with low (or no) sales tax rates. The exempting of Internet sales
thus distorts consumer behavior and thereby creates eﬃciency losses.27 Moreover, businesses
are encouraged to oﬀer their products online when they would otherwise have established a
25McLure (2000) reports that 170 tax policy specialists have voted against a permanent exemption of elec-
tronic commerce.
26Besley and Rosen (1999) show that retail prices increase when sales taxes are imposed. Although it is
generally expected that sales taxes will be fully shifted forward to consumers, Besley and Rosen (1999) ﬁnd a
variety of shifting patterns, depending on the type of good.
27Indeed, if electronic commerce is not taxed, the tax rate on traditional commodities needs to be higher to
ﬁnance a given amount of public revenue. Because the excess burden of a tax–that is, the welfare costs of
taxation in excess of the revenue collected–rises more than proportionally with the tax rate, uniform taxation
induces a smaller eﬃciency loss. See Chapter 12 of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), for a formal exposition of the
argument.
8physical store. Given that elasticity of substitution between Web-based and Main Street pur-
chases of the same good is high, optimal taxation theory prescribes that imposing a uniform
tax on both traditional and electronic commerce would minimize eﬃciency losses. Remote
sellers, however, point to the shipping and handling fees charged on Web-based sales; they
argue that such fees would oﬀset any tax advantages that they currently enjoy. This may
be true in the case of low-value purchases such as CDs; but consumers tend to buy more
expensive items, such as DVD players and computers, from retailers that do not charge sales
tax. Moreover, there are no shipping and handling fees on digital content such as downloaded
software.
Empirical evidence gathered by Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999), however, suggests that the
Internet so far has been a trade creator; people who buy online are more likely to shop at
conventional retail stores than they were before they shopped online. As time progresses,
more Internet purchases may be substituted for traditional retail purchases, partly because
of falling transport costs resulting from advances in logistics. Nevertheless, trade diversion
is bounded, reﬂecting the positive utility many households assign to the traditional shopping
experience. The jury is still out on this matter and more research is necessary.
Proponents of the taxation of electronic commerce also point to the revenue losses associ-
ated with a permanent exemption. Tanzi (2000) describes electronic commerce transactions
as “ﬁscal termites” that gnaw away at the consumption tax base. As Goolsbee and Zittrain
(1999) and Bruce and Fox (2000) show, however, sales tax revenue losses in the United States
to date have been relatively small; they are estimated at less than 2-3 percent of sales tax
revenue in 2003.28 A number of factors contribute to this result: (i) most Internet sales
(on the order of 80 percent, see McLure (2000)) involve business-to-business sales, which are
exempt from sales tax; (ii) a substantial share of retail electronic commerce involves exempt
goods and services (for example, prescription drugs); and (iii) electronic commerce is still in
its infancy. Bird (2003) argues that for Canada the revenue losses will be considerably smaller
because Internet sales are less important in absolute terms. Nonetheless, there is a real threat
of more substantial revenue losses in the future if no action is taken.29
Not only consumption tax revenues are at stake. Some countries levy customs duties on
physical trade in digital media; that revenue would be lost if the products were “imported”
electronically. Perez-Esteve and Schuknecht (1999) argue, however, that the potential tariﬀ
revenue losses would be small. Governments of developing countries–which depend heavily
on import duties30–would be hurt the most. Consumers in those countries, however, would
beneﬁt from lower prices of digital products. There is broad support in the WTO for the
exemption of electronically delivered products from customs duties. The rationale is that
28The sales tax revenue loss is US$ 612 million out of US$ 203 billion of total sales tax revenue.
29Projections of revenue losses from online sales for 2011 vary widely, ranging from US$ 4.5 billion to US$
54.8 billion (Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 2003).
30Ebrill and Stotsky (1998) have calculated that in 1990 non-OECD countries collected customs duties on
the order of 29 percent of total tax revenue whereas OECD countries collected only 1.7 percent.
9import tariﬀs cause larger by-product distortions than consumption taxes.31 Moreover, it
would not make sense to levy these duties if there is no physical border.
Finally, some observers stress equity arguments; the non-enforcement of taxes on elec-
tronic commerce will redistribute income to the wealthy because the poor are less likely to
have Internet access. In the United States, the average Internet user has two more years
of education and US$ 22,000 more family income than the average non-user (Goolsbee and
Zittrain, 1999). Over time, this argument will lose its relevance as Internet access becomes
more widespread.
Goolsbee and Klenow (1998) and Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) employ an “infant in-
dustry” argument for a temporary moratorium on Internet taxes. They stress the growth-
enhancing eﬀect of “network externalities” associated with Internet use; a person’s joining
the network makes it larger, thereby beneﬁting not only that person but also the other par-
ticipants in the network.32 For example, the value of e-mail increases with the number of
individuals who have e-mail and thus are potential exchangers of e-mail messages. Individual
users do not internalize these spillovers. As a result, too few people use the Internet if the
government does not subsidize access.33 These network externalities exist mainly in the early
stages of a network’s development.
The preferential treatment of electronic commerce on the basis of network externalities
is not desirable. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2003) reports that already a substantial
share of the US population (56 percent in 2001) uses the Internet. Moreover, exempting
s a l e so v e rt h eI n t e r n e t – a n dt h u se ﬀectively subsidizing this trade–is an indirect means of
addressing an existing distortion. As the principle of targeting (Dixit, 1985) suggests, a
distortion should be countered directly at the relevant margin. The subsidization of Internet
access fees is a more carefully targeted instrument, but in the United States and many other
countries Internet access is already given preferential treatment. Finally, Zodrow (2003)
concludes that there is no convincing direct empirical evidence that shows that these network
externalities are signiﬁcant.34 Freund and Weinbold (2004) provide some indirect evidence
on network size eﬀects, showing that a 10 percent increase in the number of Internet hosts
increases commodity export growth by 0.2 percentage points.
Those who oppose the taxing of electronic commerce point to the high administrative costs
associated with charging thousands of diﬀerent tax rates–costs for which retailers would
receive no compensation.35 Moreover, one can purchase software programs that calculate
31Keen and Ligthart (2002) show that a cut in tariﬀs combined with a point-for-point increase in domestic
consumption taxes increases both welfare and public revenue in a small open economy.
32See Shy (2001) for a detailed discussion of network externalities.
33Opponents of preferential treatment of electronic commerce warn of possible negative congestion external-
ities (for example, Gupta, Stahl and Whinston (1995)) because of zero marginal cost pricing by ISPs.
34Network externalities are diﬃcult to measure empirically. Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) have made a ﬁrst
attempt to quantify these spillovers.
35Some observers in the United States claim that the sales tax system requires considerable simpliﬁcation
before Internet sales can be made taxable. This is further discussed in Section 4.
10the amount of tax to be collected based on the address of the buyer and the amount of the
purchase. Tax authorities could also certify companies to perform the task of online tax
processing to guarantee the conﬁdentiality of information and the security of collected funds.
This topic is discussed further in Section 4.
4R e f o r m P r o p o s a l s
4.1 Tax Collection by Vendors
If electronic commerce is to be taxed, how can it be taxed eﬀectively? Most proposals put
forward in the formal and informal literature prefer tax collection on a destination basis; a
minority favors taxation at source. The common characteristic of these approaches is that the
vendor36 faces the collection and revenue transmittal obligation as in the traditional collection
model. The conventional criteria that denote a good tax system–eﬃciency, administrative
simplicity, neutrality, fairness and ﬂexibility–should be employed.37 Moreover, the allocation
of revenues should be fair; cooperation between and within countries on the design of taxa-
tion solutions is needed to prevent double taxation or no taxation of cross-border electronic
commerce.
4.1.1 Destination-Based Taxation
The OECD (2000, 2001a,b), the European Commission (2002), and various authors38 have
proposed taxation at the place of consumption39 via destination-based registration by ven-
dors.40 In this context, McLure (1997, 2000) proposes a complete overhaul of the current
US sales tax system with a view to simplifying vendor compliance and tax administration.
His proposal consists of the following elements: (i) a single uniform tax base for all states,
including conventional commerce, services, and intangibles; (ii) an exemption for all business
purchases and those merchants whose sales to consumers do not exceed a certain threshold
or a de minimis amount; (iii) a requirement for vendors to register and ﬁle with their “base”
state (the state where the vendor has a physical presence in the form of personnel and ware-
36Note that self-assessment by purchasers is also a potential collection model. As was argued earlier, this
is, given the current state of technology, not viable for business-to-consumer sales, which is the focus of this
section. Accordingly, it is not discussed further in this section.
37In 1998, the Ottawa ministerial meeting endorsed these principles, which are also known as the “Ottawa
taxation framework conditions.”
38Fox and Murray (1997), the National Tax Association (1999), and McLure (1997, 2000).
39The OECD (2001a,b) deﬁnes the place of consumption for goods trade as the customer’s residence (that
is, the home address of an individual consumer) and the “business presence” of a ﬁrm (that is, headquarters or
branch). Matters are quite diﬀerent for tangible services, in which case typically the place of service delivery–
which is equivalent to the location of the supplier–is chosen, giving rise to some origin-based taxation.
40Both the OECD (2000a, 2001a,b) and the European Commission (2002) prefer the destination-based
method, but they acknowledge that there is no single option without signiﬁcant compliance diﬃculties.
11houses) only;41 and (iv) a uniform legal framework. States would be free to set their own tax
rates. A uniform tax base, however, would undermine the ﬁscal sovereignty of local govern-
ments, and thus would be politically diﬃcult to implement. An alternative is the National
Tax Association’s (1999) project, which is less ambitious in its reforms of the tax base; it
proposes a single rate per state and a uniform menu of 100,000 potentially taxable products.
The application of destination-based registration at a global level would impose an in-
surmountable compliance burden on globally operating ﬁrms in a world of more than 100
diﬀerent VAT systems. To facilitate the process of destination-based registration, as Doern-
berg and Hinnekens (1999) argue, a real-time online system should be provided whereby the
non-resident vendor could check the validity of purchasers’ VAT tax registration numbers.
Substantial international cooperation is required to prevent blocs of countries from imple-
menting mutually inconsistent tax policies–potentially giving rise to double or no taxation
of trade ﬂows–and to provide for the mutual enforcement of tax debts.
4.1.2 Origin-Based Taxation
In view of the administrative complexities associated with taxation on a destination basis,
Ryan and Miethke (1998) and Wagner and Anderson (1999) have proposed to tax electronic
commerce at origin (that is, at the point of ﬁrst sale). This is in line with the traditional vendor
collection model, in which the vendor charges, collects, and remits the tax to the local revenue
authority. An advantage of origin taxation is its administrative simplicity. Compliance costs
would be low because vendors would deal only with the revenue administration of their home
jurisdiction. Small ﬁrms in particular would ﬁnd this a distinct advantage.
The origin-based approach has been criticized for introducing distortions in trade and
factor ﬂows and for unleashing tax competition among jurisdictions within a federation and
between national governments. Online retailers will locate themselves in places with low
consumption tax rates, and customers will buy products from Web retailers in those locations.
Indeed, tax competition is likely to be more aggressive in a digital world due to the mobility
of physical capital used in electronic commerce as compared with traditional sectors (cf. Fox
and Murray (1997)) and the lower transaction costs to consumers of making purchases–
particularly of intangibles–in other jurisdictions.
Origin-based taxation can be combined with some other mechanism to attribute rev-
enue to the place of consumption.42 The simplest technique is allocation based on aggregate
consumption statistics, as proposed by the European Commission (1996). A more complex
approach involves setting up a clearing-house sys t e m( a sp r o p o s e di na ne a r l i e rp a p e ri s s u e d
41Alternatively, he proposes the following two schemes: (i) the involvement of trusted third parties that
employ certiﬁed computer software to calculate and remit consumption tax (see Section 4); and (ii) a hybrid
system in which registration is consolidated (as in the base state system), but ﬁling is done on a state-by-state
basis.
42See Ligthart (2003) for an overview of attribution mechanisms.
12by the European Commission (1985)), which periodically compares amounts of tax revenue
associated with interjurisdictional sales and transfers revenue from the net exporting juris-
diction to the net importing jurisdiction to balance the account. This system requires close
cooperation between jurisdictional tax administrations: they must exchange information reg-
ularly to validate information such as the identity of the vendor and purchaser and their
respective taxpayer identiﬁcation numbers.
Although a revenue attribution mechanism is viable in a federation, it is cumbersome on
a world scale. International agreements on revenue transfers must be concluded and admin-
istrative cooperation is required to establish enforceability. In particular, the exchange of
taxpayer-speciﬁc information through existing arrangements–such as bilateral double taxa-
tion treaties, the recent OECD (2002) model agreement, and various multilateral treaties–
should be better utilized to prevent tax evasion.43 The Internet can facilitate timely exchanges
of information.
4.1.3 “Permanent Establishment” for Consumption Tax Purposes
Nexus issues are common to both income and consumption taxation. One might therefore
consider expanding the concept of “permanent establishment” (PE)–which is employed in
direct taxation44–for consumption tax purposes to include electronic connections such as the
location of servers and telecommunications links. However, expanding the PE deﬁnition to
include virtual presence would make it a hallow concept, because a great deal of electronic
activity would qualify.45 Moreover, the location of the server is not a good proxy for the
place where economic activity occurs (the origin principle) or the place where consumption
occurs (the destination principle); it says nothing about the importance of the economic ties
(if any) with the country. Normative issues play a role here as well; businesses should not be
subject to the tax authority of jurisdictions from which they receive no substantial beneﬁts in
terms of public goods. Finally, making taxation contingent on the location of the Web servers
induces vendors to choose hosting services that operate servers in low-tax jurisdictions.
4.2 Tax Collection by Intermediaries
Some observers have proposed using trusted third parties, such as ﬁnancial institutions and
ISPs, as new tax collectors or developing technology-based solutions (discussed later) to fa-
cilitate tax collection. Such a system would allow jurisdictions to keep their autonomy to
set their own tax policies and would require few changes to the current tax system. Compli-
43See Tanzi and Zee (1999) and Keen and Ligthart (2004) for an overview of existing bilateral and multilateral
arrangements, which provide a legal basis for the exchange of tax information between nations. Recently, the
OECD (2002) developed a model convention for information exchange covering all kinds of taxes.
44Deﬁned in the OECD model tax convention (2000b) as “a ﬁxed place of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried out.”
45See Lukas (1999) for a more detailed discussion.
13ance costs would be shifted to third parties and could potentially be reduced. Note that the
technology-based approach can be complementary to the approaches discussed in the previous
subsection.
4.2.1 Tax Withholding by Financial Intermediaries
Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999), McLure (2000), and the OECD (2001a,b) have suggested that
consumption tax on digital products be withheld through ﬁnancial institutions (that is, credit
card companies and the like) at the time of the sale, depending on the applicable tax rate
in the location of the purchaser and the type of purchaser (household or exempt business).
Such a real-time system would require the ﬁnancial institution to maintain a database of the
tax bases and rates of each state and local jurisdiction. In addition, vendors would have to
submit essential information on the sale and the parties (that is, the account numbers of the
vendor and purchaser, the value of the sales, the amount of tax due, and the billing address
of the purchaser). Typically, the billing address on ﬁle with the credit card company would
determine the location of the purchaser. To streamline the tallying and remitting of sales tax
to the jurisdiction of consumption, Eads and others (1997) have proposed that the ﬁnancial
institutions employ a clearing-house system (as discussed earlier).
The involvement of ﬁnancial institutions in consumption tax collection raises the issue
of anonymity. To avoid taxation, online shoppers might establish a mailing address in a
low-tax jurisdiction by using a post oﬃce box, a friend’s mailing address, or mail-forwarding
service. Not surprisingly, the OECD (2001a,b) and others consider credit card information
insuﬃcient evidence of the jurisdiction of residence. “Know-your-customer” rules–under
which ﬁnancial institutions are required to identify beneﬁcial owners of bank accounts–
are helpful in providing identity veriﬁcation.46 However, a purchaser’s identity cannot be
ascertained if the credit card used for payment is issued by a country with bank-secrecy laws.
The withholding of consumption taxes is an eﬀective and administratively simple way
to prevent tax evasion on transactions that pass through the banking system, but not on
transactions that are paid in other ways (for example, by digital cash). However, withholding
shifts the onus of collection from the seller to the bank, which is not involved in the actual sale
and purchase. Without any form of ﬁnancial compensation, this system is not commercially
viable; banks would have to bear the ﬁxed costs of setting up the system and the variable
costs associated with each transaction. Currently, banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are
technically not well equipped to deal with the transmission of massive amounts of data. In
sum, allocating the collection task to ﬁnancial institutions would only be legitimate if banks
are allowed to charge a fair fee for services provided.
At present, electronic commerce is dominated by credit card payments, but it unclear
whether this will always be the case. Other forms of payment systems do not require the
46See the Financial Action Task Force (1990) on “know-your-customer” rules in anti-money-laundering
activities.
14involvement of banks–for example, various forms of digital cash, of which some automatically
l e a v ea na u d i tt r a i lw h i l eo t h e r sc a n n o tb et r a c e d . 47 The use of untraceable digital cash makes
it virtually impossible to know the location and identities of the trading parties.48 Some
observers, such as Soete and Ter Weel (1998), have suggested the taxing of electronic cash ex
ante (that is, at the time it is issued). So far, digital cash has not been widely accepted, but
this could change as people grow to trust this new form of payment.
In sum, with appropriate checks on the identity of the customer, withholding could work
in a federal system, provided that a national clearing-house system is set up to attribute
tax revenue to the jurisdiction of destination and that banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
invest in the required technology and receive compensation for costs. As was noted earlier,
setting up a clearing-house system among sovereign countries is politically and practically
more diﬃcult than it is in a federation. The transmission of personal information over the
Internet raises privacy issues that must be resolved before the development of a withholding
system can proceed.
4.2.2 Collection by Internet Service Providers
Soete and Ter Weel (1998) suggest involving ISPs–which are technically able to keep track
of all Internet transactions of their customers49–as trusted third parties to charge, collect,
and remit sales tax. In line with McLure’s proposal, the ISP would register with the clearing
house, which in turn would forward the revenues to the jurisdiction or country in which the sale
occurred. The ISP, however, cannot necessarily determine where consumption actually takes
place, because it is diﬃcult to trace the true origin and destination of electronic transactions.
For example, a US consumer might purchase a digital product in the Netherlands through an
ISP located in the United Kingdom.
Some observers have suggested using Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to trace cross-border
transactions. IP addresses are used in transmitting data from point A to point B; they are an
essential part of every access point to the Internet. Some technical hurdles must be overcome.
Currently, many IP addresses are randomly assigned, which makes it diﬃcult to trace the
transactions of individual users. Moreover, IP addresses can be manipulated to hide a user’s
identity and location.50
4.3 Technology-Based Solutions
The simplest way to lower vendors’ compliance costs is by means of a technological ﬁx.
Compliance software at the point of purchase applies the tax rate of the destination state,
47See Peha and Strauss (1997) for a more detailed discussion.
48Moreover, encryption–which encodes information in such a manner that only persons who have the proper
key are able to decipher the message–could be used.
49Via a unique static IP address, Internet transactions and surﬁng behavior could easily be traced.
50To hide their identity consumers can use services such as Anonymizer.
15calculates the amount due, charges the customer’s credit card, and transfers the amount
due to the account of the tax authority of the state where ﬁnal consumption occurs. Federal
authorities could certify commercial companies (“trusted third parties”) to run the compliance
software. This system permits payments to be made in real time. Moreover, it works at the
level of individual transactions, whereas the clearing-house system aggregates transactions.
The Internet may be a threat to tax administrators, but it also oﬀers opportunities.
New technological developments may make reverse charging of business-to-consumer sales
feasible in the not too distant future. The OECD (2000a, 2001a,b) has suggested using digital
signatures51 as a solution to identity issues. In addition, a smart card–a small electronic
device similar to a prepaid calling card–could be designed to store information about a
consumer’s jurisdiction of residence, tax identiﬁcation number, and online transactions.
It is even conceivable that new technologies will enable tax administrators to capture ma
larger number of transactions in the tax net, thus more than oﬀsetting the leakage caused
by electronic commerce. For example, if all countries can agree on a uniform taxpayer iden-
tiﬁcation number to be used worldwide, as suggested by the OECD (2001b), the role of tax
administrators will be substantially strengthened. Moreover, positioning information pro-
vided by cellular phone networks and a geographic coding system of transactions could help
determine the location of the consumer at the time of an online purchase. None of these
approaches, however, is likely to be implemented in the short to medium term.
4.4 Bit Tax
Cordell and Ide (1994)52 have proposed a bit tax–a small ﬁxed fee levied on the number of bits
transmitted over the Internet. Operators of telecommunications carriers, satellite networks,
and cable systems would collect and remit payment to their home jurisdiction. To preclude
competitive distortions created, for example, by carriers locating their server networks in
zero-bit tax locations, the bit tax should be introduced on a worldwide basis. The bit tax
would apply to both business and personal transmission of information over the Internet.53
The bit tax was heavily criticized–and dismissed as a viable proposal–by the OECD’s
1998 Ottawa ministerial meeting, by the WTO and by the European Union. The bit tax
is a speciﬁc tax; it does not take into account the value of the good that is being taxed,
as and an ad valorem tax does. Accordingly, high-bit-volume, low-value transactions are
taxed disproportionately: for example, the downloading of a new computer manual would
trigger less tax than the transmission of a personal photograph, thus creating distortions.
51Digital signatures provide integrity, signature assurance, and non-repudiatability for documents transmit-
ted over the Internet. Such features are particularly important for formal documents such as contracts and
price lists.
52See also Cordell and others (1997).
53The bit tax applies to all bit transfers, including those transactions that are typically not subject to
taxation, such as downloads of personal photographs. In addition, if uploads and downloads are taxed, both
the vendor and purchaser of intangibles delivered over the Internet are taxed, giving rise to double taxation.
16Per-unit taxation is common practice for phone companies, however, which typically price
and tax phone calls on the basis of distance and usage time. Moreover, the value-added that
is generated by Internet access is diﬃcult to measure, and thus diﬃcult to tax on an ad
valorem basis. Substantial technical hurdles would have to be overcome to implement a bit
tax. Internet access points would have to be equipped with bit-measuring tools, which tend
to cost more than the revenue raised. Moreover, sophisticated users could hide bits through
compression techniques and encryption to reduce their tax burden.
5 Recent Policy Developments
5.1 The European Union
The EU debate has focused on how best to tax electronic commerce given the current tran-
sitional VAT regime. Much progress has been made in tackling the cross-border taxation
of electronically delivered services to consumers and unregistered businesses. The European
Commission (2002) has adopted a council directive on electronic commerce VAT in line with
the OECD’s (2001a,b) proposals. The directive requires non-EU vendors with Internet sales
above a threshold of euro 100,000 to register54 in the member state where its customers reside
or, under a special scheme,55 to register in a single state and charge and collect VAT at the
rate that applies in the country of registration.56 American businesses, for example, would
then need to act as tax collectors for European governments if their customers were located
in Europe. The set of services covered by the directive is deﬁn e di nA r t i c l e9o ft h es i x t h
VAT directive (European Commission, 1977) and includes Web hosting services; downloaded
software, images, music and ﬁlms; digitized publications; and electronic auctions.
The electronic commerce directive took eﬀect in July 2003 and is operating on a trail basis
for the next three years. It has been heavily criticized for imposing large compliance burdens
on non-EU vendors; they must verify the tax status (that is, business or consumer) and
the residence of their EU customers and submit tax returns to the country of registration.57
If a vendor’s customers are all located in EU member states, the vendor normally must
collect taxes under 15 diﬀerent VAT systems unless it participates in the special scheme.
The European Union’s approach suﬀers from another drawback: it discriminates against
54The registration threshold is equated to the threshold for remote supplies of physical commodities so that
neutrality in tax treatment is preserved.
55The supplier has to register electronically in the member state of choice and make an electronic VAT
return–even if it does not have sales in that period–and pay tax (if applicable) to the member state of
registration. The latter will transfer the revenue to the member state of ﬁnal consumption. See European
Commission (2002) for further details.
56Business-to-business sales of digital services are taxed on a self-assessment basis, which is also supported
in the OECD proposals (2000a, 2001a,b).
57To help non-EU vendors verify the tax status of their customers, Web-based access to VIES could be
provided.
17some products delivered online, which is not in keeping with the principle of neutrality58 as
endorsed by the 1998 ministerial meeting in Ottawa. For example, newspapers purchased
at the corner store are typically subject to a zero VAT rate, whereas digital newspapers are
taxed.
The goal of the electronic commerce directive is to put EU and non-EU vendors of digital
commerce on an equal footing in order to minimize tax distortions, but it still leaves ample
room for tax planning. A non-EU vendor could establish either a branch or a subsidiary
within an EU member state; the non-EU vendor would be subject to the same tax treatment
as its EU counterparts, which charge and collect VAT on sales to non-business EU consumers
at their domestic tax rate.59 As Heredia and Fernandes (2003) argue, the non-EU vendor
could beneﬁt from tax arbitrage by locating a branch or a subsidiary in an EU member state
with a low VAT rate. For example, Madeira60–which charges a VAT rate of 13 percent
compared with an average rate of 19.3 percent in the European Union–is likely to be a
popular location.
The European Union has moved unilaterally on a solution to the electronic commerce
issue. However, successful implementation of the electronic commerce directive requires the
cooperation of the United States, which is the main supplier of electronically delivered prod-
ucts. Such cooperation with the European Union would entail a clear loss to the US federal
government, which does not have a federal sales tax that would beneﬁt from reciprocal tax
enforcement assistance by the European Union. The states themselves face the Quill barrier
and cannot beneﬁt from reciprocal action either.
5.2 The United States
The US debate has centered on the question whether or not to tax electronic commerce.61
Under the Quill ruling, electronic commerce is treated in the same way as mail-order sales,
and thus is given preferential tax treatment. The 1998 Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA)
imposed a three-year moratorium on new Internet access taxes62 levied by states or local
58Neutrality implies that the consequence of taxation should be the same irrespective of the mode of com-
merce, the method of delivery of the product, or the location where the transaction originates.
59The sixth VAT directive prescribes that the taxable place of digitized products sold by EU vendors is the
location of the supplier and is thus independent of the place of consumption.
60Madeira is an autonomous region of Portugal, which has been able, under the regional aid Program of
the European Union, to legislate a low VAT rate–13 percent, compared with 17 percent in Portugal and 25
p e r c e n ti nS w e d e n( w h i c hh a st h eh i g h e s tr a t ei nt h eE u r o p e a nU n i o n ) .
61To be more precise, the issue is whether or not businesses should be liable for sales tax. Legally speaking,
consumers are already liable, but they do not pay the use tax. Owing to high administrative costs, tax
authorities typically do not enforce use taxes. Involving remote sellers could lower the administrative costs
considerably.
62The ITFA (1998) forbids states from applying sales tax to Internet access fees. Goolsbee (2001) shows
that if sales tax were applied to Internet access charges, the revenue collected (US$ 630 million) would exceed
the sales tax revenue loss (as discussed in Section 3).
18governments. In addition, it allowed existing sales taxes to remain in eﬀect and permitted
governments to introduce new sales taxes on electronic commerce, as long as they applied
equally to traditional commerce. In November 2001, the ITFA was extended for another two
years; it expired in November 2003 and was extended again in April 2004 for another four
years.
The most recent eﬀort in the United States to address the electronic commerce issue entails
a weak variant of McLure’s (2000) proposal to revamp the complex US sales tax. In 2000,
the National Governors’ Association, the Federation of State Tax Administrators, and the
Conference of State Legislatures set out to lower the compliance costs of vendors by designing
a voluntary sales and use tax system with common tax base deﬁnitions and similar tax-ﬁling
and audit procedures.63 In November 2002, the features of such a system were laid down in
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). As of April 2004, 42 US states and
the District of Columbia were involved in the project and 20 had enacted legislation aligning
their sales tax systems to the SSUTA.64 If a vendor agrees to comply with the SSUTA, it
will be required to collect sales and use tax in any state that is party to agreement, and
it will receive compensation for compliance. The SSUTA does not specify how closely the
compensation will match the actual compliance costs.
To lower the compliance costs of vendors, the SSUTA proposes a number of reforms. It
would require common local and state tax bases within the same state, allowing for diﬀerences
in bases across states, and would limit the number of major categories of items in the tax
base.65 Local governments would retain the autonomy to set their own rates, but no more
than one local rate would be permitted. The state tax authority would administer all local
sales taxes. Uniform sourcing rules would apply, allowing for origin taxation if the purchaser’s
location, that is, the destination of the good, cannot be determined. The agreement would
also involve the use of computer software to simplify the calculation (in real time), remittance,
and auditing of sales and use taxes. States could contract with a certiﬁed service provider
to handle those sales and use tax functions, but ﬁrms with sales in at least ﬁve states would
also be able to have their own systems certiﬁed.
The SSUTA combines features of the destination-based registration and the technology
ﬁx. It is a step in the right direction, but it falls short of a fundamental reform of the sales
and use tax system as proposed by McLure (2000). The agreement will help states in their
push for congressional action on the electronic commerce issue. The US policy line, however,
has not been coordinated with Canada, whose provinces also impose retail sales taxes (see
63The political motivation was to increase the likelihood of congressional action on the electronic commerce
issue.
64Some states adopted a modiﬁed version of the original proposal. The SSUTA was to go into eﬀect after
10 states, representing 20 percent of the population of the states that impose a sales tax, sign on. See McLure
(2003) for further details.
65The bases would diﬀer by the categories they included, but the items included in any category would be
the same across all states.
19the discussion below) and suﬀer revenue losses from Canadians who shop across the border
in the United States.
5.3 Canada
In 1998, the Canadian tax authorities indicated their intention to base any new rules for the
taxation of electronic commerce on global standards as developed by the OECD. So far, the
federal authorities have not introduced any new legislation to address electronic commerce;
instead, they have chosen the patchwork approach. Speciﬁcr u l i n g s 66 were issued to clarify
the provisions of the Excise Tax Act, which provides the legal framework for the GST. The
Canadian GST, which applies to sales of goods and services and intangible property at a
rate of 7 percent, was introduced in 1991. The GST is modeled on the VAT and features an
invoice-credit mechanism and border tax adjustments (zero-rating of exports and taxation of
i m p o r t so fg o o d sa n ds e r v i c e s ) .
A non-resident (foreign) supplier who has a PE (which is based on physical presence as
deﬁned by the OECD for income tax purposes) or who is “carrying on business” in Canada
must register for GST purposes. Non-resident ﬁrms that supply books and magazines by
mail or courier to a Canadian mailing address are considered to carry on business if they
make annual taxable supplies over $30,000.67 Imported foreign publications are not taxed
at the border, but the tax is collected directly from Canadian customers. In the context
of electronic commerce, “carrying on business” is given a restrictive interpretation; a non-
resident Web-based vendor–without much physical presence in Canada–that sells digital
goods to Canadian residents does not need to register for GST purposes. Once a foreign
supplier is registered for GST purposes, its sales of digitized products can be monitored
via periodic audits. Therefore, it makes sense to expand the registration requirement to all
non-resident ﬁrms that do not have a PE, but meet the registration threshold.
Canadian purchasers (businesses and consumers) that import “services” or “intangible
personal property” or that consume goods and services from non-resident or domestic suppli-
ers that are not registered for GST purposes are required to self-assess tax on the basis of the
place of “use.”68 Electronic downloading or ordering of digital products, and subscriptions
to electronic databases and Web sites are characterized as supplies of intangible property.
Web site hosting and software maintenance contracts, however, are classiﬁed as services.69
To be more precise, Web site access and hosting are considered telecommunications services,
which are taxed according to the place of performance of the service. As is argued earlier,
66Li (2003) reports that in July 2002 the Canadian Revenue Agency issued a technical bulletin setting out
an interpretation of provisions in the Excise Tax Act that are relevant to electronic commerce.
67Resident individuals and ﬁrms that make annual taxable supplies in Canada of more than a threshold of
$ 30,000 must register for the GST.
68Businesses need to self-assess the tax in cases where the recipient is not able to recover the tax as an input
tax credit.
69See Li (2003) for further discussion of the criteria underlying this distinction.
20self-assessment is plagued with problems; the question is whether the Canadian tax authori-
ties want to keep self-assessment if the volume of business-to-consumer electronic commerce
expands. Li (2003) sees some merit in reforming the self-assessment procedures to facilitate
the collection of small amounts.
Besides the federal GST, Canadian provinces also impose consumption taxes. British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island have single-stage
Provincial Sales Taxes (PST), which are imposed on sales of goods and on a limited number
of services. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador have replaced
their PST and the GST with the Harmonized Sales Tax, which applies a combined rate of
15 percent–of which 7 percent is the federal component and 8 percent is the provincial
component–to the same base of goods and services that is taxable under the GST. Quebec
has also harmonized the Quebec Sales Tax (QST) with the base of the GST; but Quebec
levies a QST rate of 7.5 percent, and the QST is applied to the total of the selling price plus
the GST. Resident remote suppliers without a physical presence in the destination province
may sell goods and services without registering for the PST in that province; in this way,
they enjoy a tax advantage in comparison with registered traders. The provinces have yet to
determine the tax status of electronically delivered products; at present, such products seem
not to be subject to PST.
Canada’s slow response to the electronic commerce issue could prove fruitful, because it
now has the opportunity to learn from the EU experience. If the EU approach turns out to
be eﬀective, Canada may consider adopting destination-based registration.
6C o n c l u s i o n
T h ed e v e l o p m e n to ft h eI n t e r n e th a sm a d ei tp o s s i b l ef o rﬁrms and consumers to buy tangible
and intangible commodities and services anywhere in the world. Electronic commerce in
tangible products does not raise any fundamental taxation issues because this trade is not
very diﬀerent from mail-order purchases. Sales of digitized products and services over the
Internet pose substantial tax enforcement issues, particularly in connection with business-to-
consumer sales.
Preferential tax treatment of electronic commerce is undesirable for reasons of eﬃciency
and revenue collection. A viable system of taxing electronic commerce is destination-based
registration, which requires remote vendors of digital content to register in the jurisdiction
of ﬁnal sale. To alleviate the compliance costs of ﬁrms and the administrative costs of tax
authorities, simpliﬁed electronic registration, ﬁling, and payment procedures should be devel-
oped. New technologies can facilitate this task and may, in the future, even yield new models
of tax collection.
Both the European Union and the United States have taken steps to implement destination-
based taxation of electronic commerce; the European Union has made the most progress. The
21EU approach focuses on the taxing of electronic commerce within the current VAT framework;
the US approach focuses on reform of the retail sales tax system, which would lower the com-
pliance costs of both traditional and electronic retailers. Canada is awaiting the resolution
of various key policy issues within the framework of the OECD, which has coordinated the
international debate on the taxation of electronic commerce. Besides tax policy coordination,
strong administrative cooperation between national tax authorities is required if a global so-
lution is to be found. Without reciprocal tax enforcement assistance, it is hard to eﬀectively
tax cross-border electronic transactions.
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